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REPLY BRIEF SUBMITTED ON BEHALF 
OF THE APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
.L/Respondent rojj -easons 
s lojrt September 
Defendant/Appellant Thomas I). Elliott, trustee for 
Frontier -
issues raiir,:: . . , ..*.:«,; > ,*
 t r 
Property- 'plaintiff' filed -. * 
±y, . - - - Defendar . . - . - . . -
in , a. .:. defend on t iwte . r 
v; clarify ceitoin .ssjes r.iuv?c r Is Brie: and reply -
certain cth^r .^?-.;p.<- raised by plaintiff's T;^"ief, jume issues 
3r:i et: were not addressed by , \) a i n t i f f ' s 
response. Defendant stands upon the arguments as set forth in 
his Brief, Other issues addressed by plaintiff's Brief will 
not be a subject of this Brief. Defendant similarly stands 
upon the arguments in his Brief as to those issues. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF THAT CONDUCT OF 
DEFENDANT RESULTED IN THE FAILURE TO PROCURE A SALE OF 
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff states in its Brief: 
These endeavors to sell the subject property 
failed for various reasons, some due to the 
Trustee's action, Lincoln's demand that the rate 
of interest be increased because of a provision 
of their note and mortgage, Trustee's demand to 
make a profit on the transaction and Trustee's 
failure to communicate offers to Four Seasons. 
[Respondent's Brief at 4]. Plaintiff thus indicates that 
potential sales of the property failed because of defendant's 
actions. This statement presumably is based upon the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court. 
There is, however, no evidence in the record to support such a 
finding, and, as such, it should be overturned by this Court. 
Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d 185 (Utah 
1983) (judgment will be affirmed where findings of fact are 
substantiated by the evidence). 
There is no evidence in the record that defendant's 
initial desire to dispose of the property at a slight profit to 
the bankruptcy estate resulted in the failure to sell the 
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subject property. [Tr. at 38-40, 42.] Instead, the 
overwhelming evidence is that the sole factor resulting in the 
failure to sell the property was the insistence by the first 
mortagagee (Lincoln Savings) that its due on sale clause be 
enforced and its interest rate be increased to the market 
rate. [Tr. at 34, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 158.] 
Additionally, there is absolutely no evidence in the 
record to support a finding that the defendant failed to 
communicate offers for purchase to plaintiff. The testimony of 
J.F. Cannon, general partner of plaintiff is contrary to such 
an assertion: 
Q. (By Mr. Duffin) During that period of time 
that the trustee—the trustee was in possession 
from January 22, 1982 until the stay was lifted 
in July of 1982. He sent you these two offers. 
Do you know whether he was soliciting other 
offers, or are there other offers that you do not 
have here? 
A.(By Mr. Cannon) I don't know of any other 
offers. 
Q. Those two were sent by you? 
A. Those two were sent to me from the trustee. 
[Tr. at 36.] The testimony of defendant Thomas D. Elliott 
concurs with that given by Mr. Cannon: 
Q. (By Mr. Duffin) Would it be safe in saying 
that from your position as the trustee of 
bankruptcy in this case, that the problem of the 
sale was tied in to getting the underlying 
financing people to agree with the terms of the 
sale? 
A. (By Mr. Elliott) Yes, in most cases. 
-3-
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Q. How many sales did you originate in the six 
months that you had the property? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. We know at least two, were there more you 
didn't sent [sic] to us? 
A, I think every one that was reduced to writing 
we either discussed with Jess or we sent him a 
copy of it. 
Thus, the unrebutted evidence was that the failure to sell the 
subject property was related to the terms and conditions 
imposed by the underlying lien holders, not the conduct of 
defendant. The trial court's finding to the contrary should be 
overturned, and to the extent the judgment entered by the trial 
court in favor of plaintiff relied upon that finding, it, too, 
should be overturned. Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 
106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1944). 
POINT II: CONTRARY TO THE ASSERTIONS OF PLAINTIFF, 
THE FACTS SHOW THAT HEALY WAS THE IMPLIED AGENT OF 
PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff correctly acknowledges that an agency may be 
created by implication, estoppel, necessity or operation of 
law. Plaintiff also correctly reports the statements of law 
contained in Forsevth v. Pendelton. 617 P.2d 358 (Utah 1980) 
and True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 
(Wyo. 1978). Of course, the law recited in the aforementioned 
cases is limited to the facts and circumstances of those 
cases. It is widely held that whether an implied agency exists 
is dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of a 
0630L 
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given case. Durham v. Warnberg, 62 Or. App. 378, 660 P.2d 208 
(1983); Curtis v. CIA Machinery, Inc., 571 P.2d 862 (Okla. App. 
1977); Matsumara v. Eilert, 74 Wash. 2d 362, 444 P.2d 806 
(1968). 
Plaintiff argues in its Brief that the facts of the 
present case do not create an implied agency because there is 
no evidence that plaintiff as principal controlled the actions 
of Healy as agent. [Respondent's Brief at 13.] Plaintiff also 
argues that implied agency cannot exist in the present case 
because both plaintiff's general partner, J.F. Cannon, and 
Healy denied the existence of an agency relationship. rid.1 
Assuming arguendo, that, as plaintiff contends, no 
evidence of control exists in the record, control of the agent 
is only one factor considered in determining the existence of 
an implied agency; it is not necessarily the determinative 
factor. The court in Abel v. Firs Bible and Missionary 
Conference, 57 Wash. 2d 853, 360 P.2d 356 (1961), ruled that 
[W]hile agency can be inferred from the right of 
control, it is still only evidence of an agency. 
Here there is no dispute that the act in question 
was performed in fulfillment of the Fir's 
contract. When the maxim qui facit per alium 
facit per se is clearly applicable, an agency is 
established without reference to the right of 
control. 
Id. at 358. The Abel ruling was issued in the context of a 
negligence action arising out of an automobile accident; 
nevertheless, the principle articulated in Abel that clearly 
established control is not necessary to a finding of implied 
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agency when other facts so suggest an agency relationship is 
applicable to the present case. Accordingly, the sum total of 
facts and circumstances in the present case as set forth in the 
defendant's Brief and as further set forth below compel the 
conclusion that Healy was the implied agent of plaintiff. 
An implied agency may be based upon the past dealings 
and prior habits established between the parties. True v. 
Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1978). 
The evidence in the present case reveals a course of past and 
present real estate transactions and partnerships involving 
plaintiff's general partners and Healy. [Tr. at 60, 75, 118.] 
Furthermore, it is not necessary that the alleged principal and 
agent understand their relationship to be one of principal and 
agent if by their actions such relationship exists in fact, and 
it matters not that the parties do not call themselves agent 
and principal. Curtis v. CIA Machinery, Inc., 571 P.2d 862 
(Okla. App. 1977); Petersen v. Turnbull, 68 Wash. 2d 231, 412 
P.2d 349 (1966). That concept was clearly stated by the court 
in Canyon State Canners v. Hooks, 74 Ariz. 70, 243 P.2d 1023 
(1952): 
The relation of agency need not depend upon 
express appointment and acceptance thereof, but 
may be, and frequently is, implied from the words 
and conduct of the parties and the circumstances 
of the particular case. If, from the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case, it appears 
that there was at least an implied intention to 
create it, the relation may be held to exist 
notwithstanding a denial by the alleged 
principal, and whether or not the parties 
understood it to be an agency. . . . 
0630L 
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Id. at 1024 (quoting 2 C.J.S., Agency §23 at 1045-46). Thus, 
an implied agency may arise notwithstanding the denials of the 
principal and agent and regardless of their intent to create an 
agency. 
Circumstantial evidence of an agency may suffice to 
establish an implied agency notwithstanding the sworn denials 
of the principal and agent that no agency relationship was 
established. Curtis v. CIA Machinery, Inc.. 571 P.2d 862 
(Okla. App. 1977) (implied agency based on circumstantial 
evidence although principal and agent had filed affidavits 
denying any agency relationship). 
In Butler v. Colorado International Pancakes, Inc., 
510 P.2d 443 (Colo. App. 1973), a case particularly instructive 
for the present case, the court held that an implied agency 
existed between a franchisor and a former franchisee in the 
acquisition of a franchise from a sub-franchisee. In so 
ruling, the court concluded (1) that the franchisor had 
requested the former franchisee to repurchase the franchise for 
the franchisor's benefit, (2) that the former franchisor had 
carried out that request, and (3) that, between the two, only 
the franchisor was in a position to benefit from the 
transaction. The court reasoned that, notwithstanding the 
parties protestations to the contrary, an agency may be created 
by the conduct of the principal and agent. The law, the court 
emphasized, "[W]ill look at the conduct and factual 
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relationship rather than the intent or words of the 
agreement." Id. at 445. 
Similarly, an implied agency should have been found by 
the trial court based upon the circumstances and facts of the 
present case. Plaintiff's general partner requested that Healy 
purchase the subject property for the benefit of plaintiff. 
[Tr. at 7]. Plaintiffs general partner and Healy were in 
continual contact concerning the property for a period of many 
months following the filing of Frontier's bankruptcy petition. 
[Tr. 87-91]. Pursuant to plaintiff's request, Healy purchased 
an interest in the property. Healy, a sophisticated 
businessman, acquired the property knowing full well that all 
attempts to sell the property in the past year had failed and 
with full knowledge that the first mortgagee insisted on 
enforcing its due-on-sale clause. [Tr. at 116-118.] It could 
be concluded that only plaintiff was in a position to benefit 
from Healy's acquisition of the property. 
Other circumstantial evidence of a principal-agent 
relationship includes: 
(1) Healy and plaintiff's general partners had been 
for several years, and still were at the time of 
Healy's acquisition of the subject property, 
partners in various real estate endeavors. [Tr. 
at 75-76]. 
0630L 
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(2) Plaintiff's general partner discussed with Healy, 
prior to Healy's acquisition of the subject 
property, subordinating his position to that of 
Lockhart Company and Zions Bank. [Tr. at 91]. 
(3) During the period of Healy's ownership of the 
property, plaintiff continued to make payments on 
underlying obligations secured by the subject 
property. [Tr. at 100, 101]. 
(4) Healy conveyed the property to plaintiff's 
general partners and their wives — just two 
short months after his acquisition of the 
property — purportedly in exchange for the 
forgiveness of an undefined past indebtedness. 
The entire transaction was evidenced by only a 
Warranty Deed. [Tr. at 107]. 
Based upon the foregoing unrebutted evidence, defendant submits 
that Healy was plaintiff's implied agent despite the denials by 
plaintiff and Healy that an agency relationship existed. 
POINT III: ALTHOUGH BENEFIT OF BARGAIN DAMAGES ARE 
GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO THE BREACH OF A REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT, PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES IN THE PRESENT CASE 
AROSE FROM THE NOTE AND MORTGAGE, NOT THE CONTRACT. 
Defendant does not dispute the argument set forth by 
plaintiff in its Brief that benefit of the bargain damages 
generally are properly awarded for a breach of a land sale 
contract. This argument, however, misconstrues defendant's 
_9„ 
0630L 
contention . Defendant contends that any damages suffered by-
plaintiff in the present action arose under the note and 
mortgage (by virtue of plaintiff's election to treat the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract (MContractM) as a note and 
mortgage), not under the Contract. While this distinction may 
appear to be less significant for purposes of the present case, 
it is crucial that damages be properly characterized for 
purposes of payment of plaintiffs alleged claim from the 
Frontier bankruptcy estate* 
On August 6, 1983, plaintiff exercised its election 
under paragraph 16(c) of the Contract to treat the Contract as 
a note and mortgage. [R. at 1930, Tr. at 36, Respondent's 
Brief at 8]. Subsequently, plaintiff commenced its action to 
foreclose its mortgage. Prior to completion of that 
foreclosure proceeding, however, plaintiff's mortgage was 
Msold-out" by the foreclosure of the senior Coleman trust 
deed. Thus plaintiff, as a junior interest holder, presumably 
had lost its security. The law is clear in this and other 
jurisdictions that if a junior lienholder's security has been 
lost or disposed of through the foreclosure of a senior 
interest, a personal action may be brought on the note. 
Lockhart Company v. Eguitable Realty, Inc., 657 P.2d 1333 
(Utah 1983); Utah Mortgage and Loan Company v. Black, 618 P.2d 
43 (Utah 1980); Cache Valley Banking Company v. Logan Lodge No. 
1453, B.P.O.E., 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936); Gebrueder 
0630L 
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Heidemann, K.G. v. A.M.R. Corporation, 107 Idaho 275, 688 P.2d 
1180 (1984); Keever v. Nicholas Beers Company, 96 Nev. 509, 611 
P.2d 1079 (1980); McMillan v. United Mortgage Co., 84 Nev. 99, 
437 P.2d 878 (1968). 
Plaintiff, however, did not bring an action on the 
note after its security was lost. It amended its complaint to 
assert an action under the Contract even though an action on 
the note was still available. In essence, plaintiff effected a 
Mde-electionH, reverting to an action on the Contract after it 
had already elected to treat the Contract as a note and 
mortgage. Defendant submits that such a de-election is 
improper. No basis in law can be found for allowing such an 
action. Rather, as stated above, all applicable authorities 
would require that an action be brought on the note. 
Accordingly, plaintiff improperly brought its action on the 
Contract and the trial court's characterization of plaintiff's 
damages as arising under the Contract was likewise improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant seeks the reversal of the trial court's 
judgment in favor of plaintiff based upon the arguments and law 
set forth in defendant's Brief previously filed with this Court 
and this Reply. Specifically, defendant submits that no 
evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's 
findings that defendant's conduct resulted in the failure to 
procure a sale of the subject property. Additionally, 
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defendant contends that under all the facts and circumstances 
of the case and the relationship between Healy and plaintiffs 
general partners, Healy was, at the very least, the implied 
agent of plaintiff in acquiring the subject property. Finally, 
defendant submits that after plaintiff's election to treat the 
Contract as a note and mortgage, and after the security for the 
note was lost through the foreclosure of a senior trust deed, 
plaintiff was left with an action on the note, not the 
Contract. Based on the foregoing and the Brief previously 
filed by defendant, the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 1985. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 
< r i\ 
-. M< / 
By ' '" ' " ' 
Counsel for Defendant 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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